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THE STRENGTHENED BTWC PROTOCOL:  IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
by Malcolm R Dando
Introduction
1.  The mandate1 for the Ad Hoc Group (AHG) is "to consider appropriate measures,
including possible verification measures, and draft proposals to strengthen the Convention".
The mandate includes also the requirement that:
"Measures should be formulated and implemented in a manner designed to protect
sensitive commercial proprietary information and legitimate national security needs."
and that:
"Measures shall be formulated and implemented in a manner designed to avoid any
negative impact on scientific research, international cooperation and industrial
development."
The Ad Hoc Group have throughout their deliberations kept these requirements at the
forefront of their consideration of an effective regime to strengthen the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention (BTWC).
2.  The fifth version2  of the draft Protocol was produced following the June/July 1998 AHG
meeting at which there were clear indications of moves towards the consideration of clean
texts in which only major points of difference remain.  It has thus become apparent that the
endgame of the negotiations has either already begun or is imminent.  It is certainly true that
the current version of the draft Protocol already contains all the essential elements of an
integrated regime3 to strengthen the BTWC.
3.  Although some States have kept their national biotechnology and pharmaceutical
industries informed of the developments in the negotiations, it is evident that in some
countries the potential implications for industry are less well understood.   The meetings in
1998 organised by the UK (in its capacity as holder of the EU Presidency) for European
industry (Brussels, early May), and by the European Federation for Biotechnology (Vienna,
                                                
1 United Nations, Special Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction, BWC/SPCONF/1, Geneva, 19 - 30 September 1994.
2 United Nations, Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction,
BWC/AD HOC GROUP/41, Geneva,  16 July 1998.
3 University of Bradford, The Strengthened BTWC Protocol:  An Integrated Regime, Briefing Paper No. 10,
July 1998.  Available on the web at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
2late May)4 to examine the implications for biotechnology of a strengthened BTWC Protocol
were very timely.
4.  This Briefing Paper examines the likely implications of the central elements of the
Protocol for industry and considers the extent to which the negotiators have successfully met
the objective of their mandate to devise measures designed to protect sensitive commercial
proprietary information and to avoid any negative impact on industrial development.  It is
concluded that the draft Protocol will not impose a significant additional burden upon an
industry that is already tightly regulated and controlled in most parts of the world.
The Draft Protocol
5.  The central and essential elements of the Protocol to strengthen the BTWC are widely
recognised5 as comprising:
Declarations of a range of facilities and activities of potential relevance under the
Convention so as to enhance transparency;
Provisions for visits to facilities in order to promote accurate and complete
declarations and thus further enhance transparency and confidence;
Provision for rapid and effective investigations into concerns over non-compliance,
including both facility and field investigations; and
A cost-effective and independent organisation, including a small permanent staff,
capable of implementing the Protocol effectively.
These would be complemented with Articles in the Protocol addressing national
implementation measures, confidentiality, and enhancing the implementation of Article X
(peaceful cooperation) and of Article III (non-transfer) of the Convention.
6.  The elements of the Protocol of greatest relevance to the biotechnology and
pharmaceutical industry are the requirements for declarations, the procedures for visits to
facilities, the facility investigations and the provisions for the safeguarding of confidentiality.
The likely requirements in the Protocol for each of these is considered in turn.
Declarations
7.  In the VEREX process mandated by the Thrid Review Conference in 1991, declarations
were defined as "Mandatory, periodic reporting on a regular basis of information considered
to be of relevance for verification of the B[T]WC"   and were one of the 21 single measures
                                                
4See Graham S Pearson, A Strengthened BTWC:  Three Specialist Conferences,  ASA Newsletter 98-4, 14
August 1998, issue number 67, p.10.
5 See for example Working Paper BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 296, 10 July 1996 submitted by 29 western and
eastern States Parties including Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and the
United States.
3evaluated.6   At the third meeting of VEREX a working paper by the rapporteur, which
provided the evaluation of declarations, stated that:7
"...Declarations were considered to be a major off-site measure from which national
profiles or patterns of biological activity could be assessed against other sources of
information.  Using the declaration mechanism, nations could share information
regarding biological activities and could, in effect explain to States Parties activities
which may otherwise cause compliance concerns."
The final report of VEREX stated that "The measure "Declarations" was most frequently
identified for application in combination with other measures."  and noted that "...the view
was expressed that declarations and on-site inspections might be further considered at a
later stage."   At the Special Conference of States Parties in 1994 which considered the final
report of VEREX, there was evidence of widespread understanding of the importance of
declarations in a verification system for the BTWC.8
8.  In considering the impact of declarations on the biotechnology and pharmaceutical
industry it is important to distinguish clearly between the trigger for a declaration to be
required and the information to be provided in a declaration.  Thus, for example, in the
confidence-building measures agreed at the Second Review Conference of the BTWC in
1986 and extended at the Third Review Conference in 1991 the trigger for CBM A Part I is a
"Facility having maximum containment laboratory meeting criteria for BL4 or P4" whilst the
information required to be submitted includes the name of the facility, its location, financing
and so on.
9.   Although there has been much discussion in the Ad Hoc Group of what should be the
triggers for declarations, the language in the current Protocol is for declarations of the
following range of activities and facilities:9
D.  DECLARATIONS
[(A)   PAST OFFENSIVE/DEFENSIVE PROGRAMMES]
....
[(B)    CURRENT DEFENSIVE PROGRAMMES]
...
                                                
6 United Nations,  Report of the Ad Hoc Group of Government Experts to Identify and Examine Potential
Verification Measures from a Scientific and Technical Standpoint.  BWC/CONF.III/VEREX/9, Geneva, 24
September 1993.
7 United Nations, Declarations (Rapporteur: Ms A. Duncan), BWC/CONF.III/VEREX/9, Geneva, 1993, pages
166-173.
8 University of Bradford, Discriminating Triggers for Mandatory Declarations.  Briefing Paper No. 3,
September, 1997.   Available on the web at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
9 United Nations, Procedural Report of the Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons
and on their Destruction, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/41, Geneva, 16 July 1998.
4[(a) Activities
(i) The presence/absence of [military] [civilian] [national] [biological]
defence programmes [against biological and toxin weapons];
[(ii) Any additional information related to past offensive and/or defensive
activities not provided in the initial declaration.]]
(b) Facilities
(i) [Which as their main task are] [taking part in] [military] [civilian]
[national] [biological] defence [facilities taking part in] programme(s)
[against biological and toxin weapons [as per listed agents or toxins]] [and
conducting work on microorganisms or toxins as well as material imitating
their properties].
[(C)    VACCINE PRODUCTION FACILITIES]
(ii) Which produce vaccines [and/or toxoids/anatoxins] [licensed by the
State Party] for the protection of humans [against listed agents or toxins]
[with a production capacity as specified in Annex ...] [with primary
production containment];
(iii) Which produce vaccines [and/or toxoids/anatoxins] [licensed by the
State Party] for the protection of animals [against listed agents or toxins]
[with a production capacity as specified in Annex ...] [with primary
production containment];
[(iv) Which produce plant inoculants and/or biological control agent(s) and
have a plant quarantine capability [with primary production containment];]
....
[(D)    MAXIMUM BIOLOGICAL CONTAINMENT LABORATORIES]
(v) Which have any maximum containment laboratories meeting criteria
designated as [Biosafety Level 4 ((BL4) according to WHO Classification) or
P4 (according to WHO Classification) or equivalent standards] [maximum
containment];
....
[(E)    HIGH BIOLOGICAL CONTAINMENT FACILITIES]
[(vi) Containing areas protected [by high containment] [according to
Biosafety Level 3 (BL3) [as specified in the 1993 WHO Laboratory Biosafety
Manual]] [and working with listed agents or toxins] but excluding purely
diagnostic [and medical] facilities;]
[(F)    WORK WITH LISTED AGENTS]
5(vii) Which
[work with listed agents or toxins with the exclusion of facilities
involved only in diagnostic and/or medical treatment activities;]
or
[have an aggregate fermenter capacity of 100 litres or more and work
with or produce listed agents;]
or
[conduct any of the following activities with any of the agents or toxins
listed in Annex A excluding those involved only in diagnostic and/or
medical treatment activities:
[- research and development, including on detection or
identification methods [and with an aggregate production capacity on
site of 100 litres or more] [and with [high containment] [certain
containment characteristics including negative air pressure]];]
[- production of such agents or toxins [and/or of vaccines against
them] [with an aggregate production capacity on site of 100 litres or
more] [and with [certain containment characteristics including
negative air pressure] [primary production containment]];]
[- maintain culture collections [registered and designated by the
government] and provide professional services on demand;]
[- apply genetic modification techniques] [[to enhance
pathogenicity, virulence or resistance to environmental
factors/antibiotics] [focussing on genetic elements containing nucleic
acid sequences coding for the determinants of pathogenicity of listed
microorganisms or toxins for introduction into agents not listed in
Annex A]];
[- aerobiology];]
....
[(G)    NON-VACCINE PRODUCTION FACILITIES]
[(viii) Other microbiological production facilities [including development
facilities] not working with listed agents which have an aggregate fermenter
production capacity of [100] [1000] litres or more
[with primary production containment;]
[- which produce by fermentation (i) medicines and/or
6(ii) antibiotics or (iii) other microorganisms in closed systems].]
[(ix) Not working with listed agents or toxins which
[- possess aerosol [explosive] test chambers of ... m3 or above for
work with microorganisms or toxins;]
[- possess equipment for aerosol dissemination in the open air
with a particle mass median diameter not exceeding [10] microns
[excluding those for purely routine agricultural [, health or
environmental] use];]
[- conduct research and development with microorganisms
containing nucleic acid sequences coding for determinants of
pathogenicity or toxicity of listed agents or toxins;]
[- conduct genetic modification [to enhance pathogenicity and
virulence [or resistance to environmental factors/antibiotics]] [with
BL3 containment or equivalent standard] [with high containment]
[and have an aggregate production capacity of 100 litres or more].]]
....
[(H)    TRANSFERS
[(I)      APPEARANCE OF OUTBREAKS OF DISEASE OR EPIDEMICS
[(J)     DECLARATIONS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE X OF      THE
CONVENTION
[(K)    NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND REGULATIONS
10.   Clearly, declaration requirements under several of these headings are of little or no
concern to the civil biotechnology and pharmaceutical industry.   In addition, careful
examination of the draft Protocol indicates that one of the above triggers which would require
declarations from industry -- namely
[(E)    HIGH BIOLOGICAL CONTAINMENT FACILITIES]
[(vi) Containing areas protected [by high containment] [according to
Biosafety Level 3 (BL3) [as specified in the 1993 WHO Laboratory Biosafety
Manual]] [and working with listed agents or toxins] but excluding purely
diagnostic [and medical] facilities;]
-- is not elaborated further unlike the other triggers in the draft Protocol.   It is therefore
reasonable to assume that this trigger will not be included in the final Protocol.
11.  As might be expected, several of the States Parties engaged in the Ad Hoc Group
negotiations have carried out surveys of their national microbiological capabilities in order to
gain an appreciation of how many facilities would indeed have to be declared should such
triggers be incorporated into the Protocol.    An analysis of these surveys, which have largely
7been made by developed countries, last year led to the broad conclusion10 that:
"...the number of facilities in each country that would need to be declared under
triggers chosen to capture those facilities of most relevance to the Convention
would be relatively limited with numbers in the order of 10s in each country..."
This view was confirmed by the Austria/UK contribution11 to the EU seminar for the
pharmaceutical industry in May 1998 which stated that "the number of facilities in
individual EU countries that would need to be declared can probably be measured in tens
rather than hundreds".
12.   The total numbers of facilities to be declared world-wide can thus be estimated12 as
being of the order of 1600 to 3200 assuming a figure of 10 to 20 facilities is taken as the
average for 160 States Parties.  This total is consistent with the number of 2500 estimated by
others13.    It is thus clear that whilst some commentators14 may have given the impression
that all possible civil industrial facilities would have to be declared, this is incorrect  and that
as others such as Douglas J. MacEachin (former Deputy Director for Intelligence of the US
Central Intelligence Agency) have argued recently15, it is important is to design triggers that
will require declaration of those sites that are "especially relevant to possible weapons
purposes".
13. Careful examination of the draft Protocol shows why such relatively small numbers of
facilities are likely to be required to be declared.  Those triggers which might be expected to
produce large numbers of industrial declarations are combined with exemptions which will
reduce the numbers of facilities to be declared.  For example, the Protocol reads, in regard to
facilities to be declared:
"[(E) High Biological Containment Facilities]
[(vi) Containing areas protected [by high containment] [according to Biosafety Level
3 (BL3) [as specified in the 1993 WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual]] [and working
with listed agents or toxins] but excluding purely diagnostic [and medical]
facilities;]" [ Emphasis added]
                                                
10 University of Bradford, Discriminating Triggers for Mandatory Declarations.  Briefing Paper No. 3,
September, 1997.    Available on the web at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
11 Austria and the United Kingdom, Industry and Declarations, UK Presidency and the European Commission:
The BWC and the Pharmaceutical Industry, 13 May 1998.
12University of Bradford, The Strengthened BTWC Protocol:  An Integrated Regime,  Briefing Paper No. 10,
July, 1998.    Available on the web at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
13Federation of American Scientists Working Group on BW Verification, Estimate of the Number of Declared
Facilities, revised September 1997.
14 Taylor, T. and Johnson, L. C., The Biotechnology Industry of the United States: A Census of Facilities.
Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, 1995.
15 MacEachin, D. J., Routine and Challenge: Two pillars of verification.  The CBW Conventions Bulletin, 39, 1-
3, 1998.
8although, as noted above, this trigger is unlikely to appear in the final Protocol, and:
"[(F) Work with Listed Agents]
(vii) Which
[work with listed agents or toxins with the exclusion of facilities involved only in
diagnosis and/or medical treatment and activities;]
and, under "G. Non-Vaccine Production Facilities", in paragraph 15 of the current draft, the
requirement is for an initial declaration and annual declarations of facilities which at any time
in the previous year have:
"Produced medicines, antimicrobials, pesticides, plant inoculants, enzymes,
...peptides or amino acids, nucleic acids or genetic elements, microorganisms for
use in biotransformation processes; or produced microorganisms in areas
protected by high containment,
when
(a) This involved [possession] [use] of a fermenter/bioreactor exceeding [300]
litres in capacity, or smaller fermenters/bioreactors with an aggregate capacity
exceeding [300] [1000] litres, or continuous or perfusion fermenters/bioreactors
with a flow rate capable of exceeding [2] [20] litres per hour;
or
(b) This involved production by other methods with an annual consumption
exceeding [...] embryonated eggs or [...] litres of tissue culture medium or [...]
litres of other medium."
However, the text goes on in the following paragraph to state that:
"A facility should not be declared under paragraph 15 if:
The [fermenters/bioreactors were] [facility was] solely [possessed] [used] for
bioremediation or waste treatment, or for manufacture for sale or use of soap,
cosmetics, detergents, fertilizers, or foods or beverages for humans or animals [,
or of single cell proteins]."
In short then, it would appear that the negotiators are succeeding in crafting a set of triggers
for mandatory declarations that will not impact most of civil industry at all.
14.  Although Annex A on Declarations consists of six sections:
"[I.  Definitions
II. Lists and Criteria (Agents and Toxins)
III. List of Equipment
IV. [Thresholds]
V. Programmes and Facilities
9VI. Declaration Formats."
there is, as yet, no text for section V or, particularly, for section VI on Declaration  Formats.
However, Section III, List of Equipment, is useful in the insight it gives into the level of
detail that might eventually be required in declarations.   The current langauage makes it clear
that attention is being given to devising a format that will be clear and straightforward to
complete using a multiple choice Yes/No approach where possible.
15.    Some detail of the kinds of information to be provided in declarations is covered in the
following Appendices to the Protocol:
"A.  [Information to be Provided in Declarations of [Biological] Defence Programmes
[Against Biological Weapons]]
B.  Information to be Provided in Declarations of Facilities taking Part in [Biological]
Defence Programmes [Against Biological Weapons]
C.  Information to be Provided in Declarations of Past Biological and Toxin Offensive
and/or Defensive Research and Development Programmes
D.   [Information to be Provided in Declarations of Other Facilities]."
The title of Appendix D carries a footnote (No 131) pointing out that it is an interim step in
the design of declaration formats and that, whilst it is useful to consider two categories of
trigger (stand-alone and combinations), the dichotomy is suggested as a temporary expedient
in working towards "the ultimate objective of declaration format(s) based on a simple
uniform relationship between the trigger and the focus of information required".  This goal
has not yet been achieved but, despite that indeterminacy, it is quite clear that confidential
proprietary information is intended to be fully protected as the footnote goes on to state :
"Declared information will be passed to all States Parties to the Protocol.  Accordingly,
the design of the declaration formats is intended to avoid reference to confidential
proprietary information or national security information..." [Emphasis added]
This intention to fully protect confidential proprietary information has also been recognised
elsewhere16.    However, the nature of the information that will eventually be required in
declarations can be seen from the current text in this Appendix.
16. The information to be provided in declarations of "other facilities", which are clearly of
most concern to industry, falls into two categories.   First some general information about the
name, location and ownership of the facility and secondly some more specific information
about the triggered function/activity.
17.   The general information is for each facility under the following headings:
                                                
16See, for example, Austria and the United Kingdom, Industry and Declarations, UK Presidency and the
European Commission: The BWC and the Pharmaceutical Industry, 13 May 1998 and Fidler, D. P., Legal
Measures for the Protection of Confidential Information in the January 1998 Rolling Text of the Proposed BWC
Protocol.  Federation of American Scientists, Washington D.C., March 1998.
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"[For vaccine production facilities...]
[For facilities producing vaccines and/or anatoxins to protect humans and animals
against listed agents or toxins...]
[For facilities with BL4 protected areas (Biosafety Level 4 (BL4) according to WHO
Classification) or P4 (according to WHO Classification) or equivalent standard...]
[For facilities that work with listed agents or toxins and have a production capability on
site and other production facilities not necessarily working with listed agents or toxins...]
[For facilities (except for diagnostic facilities) at which work is carried out on listed
agents or toxins...]
[For facilities with equipment for production in the open air of aerosols with particle size
not greater than 10 micrometres of any microorganisms or toxins, as well as materials
that imitate their properties...]"
As an example, the information required for the last group of facilities detailed above is as
follows:
"1.  Name of  facility.
2.    Location (address and geographical location).
3.    Ownership (government department or company).
4.  List the microorganisms or toxins, as well as materials that imitate their
properties, on which work is being carried out.
5.   Indicate the main areas of activity of the facility (development of means and
methods of prophylaxis, detection and isolation; genetic manipulation; aerobiology;
toxicology; disinfection and other activities related to the purposes of the
Convention)."
Clearly, provision of such information will be straightforward and is unlikely to be an
excessively onerous task.
18.  More specific information is required in regard to functions or activities at the site.  In
Part A, information is required under the following headings:
"Information  is required for [facility activities] [the following functions/activities at the
site] not involving commercial proprietary or national security information:
[(a) The triggered function/activity, that is the function/activity at the site which has been
triggered for declaration.
[[(b) Specified linked functions/activities...]
[(c) Other activities at the site.  A general description only is required...]]"
There then follow 21 questions under three general headings which have to be completed for
each triggered function or activity.  The first eight questions under the heading "General
Information About the Triggered Function/Activity" cover matters such as the location,
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ownership, funding, staffing, possession of animal holding units or waste treatment/dispersal
plants and general description of work.  Questions 9 to 20 come under the heading "Scientific
and Technical Information" and request the following information:
"[Information for the triggered function/activity
Fields of activity]
9.   Trigger:  Specify which trigger applies.
10. Is this triggered function/activity involved in work in any of the following subject
areas?  Such work may be, inter alia, research, development, testing, evaluation or
production. Purely diagnostic work, for example in a medical, veterinary or food hygiene
context, need not be declared. Work performed purely in order to set up standard operating
procedures for equipment at the facility need not be declared.
(a)  Vaccines Yes / No
(b)  Other prophylaxis or therapy techniques for humans or animals Yes / No
(c)  Plant inoculants Yes / No
(d)  Pathogenicity, virulence, infectivity or stability in the environment Yes / No
       of microbial or other biological agents or toxins, or resistance to
       antimicrobial agents
(e)  Toxicity Yes / No
(f)  Studies involving genetic modification Yes / No
(g)  Aerobiology Yes / No
(h)  Detection, identification or diagnostic techniques Yes / No
(i)   Physical protection techniques Yes / No
(j)   Decontamination/disinfection techniques Yes / No
(k) Insect/pest control techniques for use in agriculture/horticulture Yes / No
(l) Production using fermenters Yes / No
(m) Production of microbial or other biological agents or toxins Yes
/ No
other than in fermenters
11. If the triggered function/activity includes work with biological agents or toxins on the
list at Annex, specify the agents worked with by annotating the corresponding entry in the
list [as 'T'].
[Information for any specified linked functions/activities
12. Does the triggered function/activity have any links involving the cooperative handling
of microbial or other biological agents or toxins, with the following areas at this site:
(a) Laboratories Yes / No
(b) Animal houses Yes / No
(c) Production areas Yes / No
(d) Waste treatment areas Yes / No
[If yes, indicate whether such linked areas:
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[- Work in any additional subject areas on the list at question 10.  If so, indicate which
areas by annotating the corresponding entry in the list as 'A'.]
[- Handle any additional biological agents or toxins in the list at Annex.  If so, indicate
which agents or toxins by annotating the corresponding entry in the list at Annex as 'A'.]]]
[Information for all the above declared functions/activities]
13. If vaccines are produced, list them.
Containment areas
14. (a) Does the facility have rooms/other enclosures with a maximum level of
biological containment for human or animal pathogens, BL4 (as specified in the 1993
WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual) or equivalent?
Yes / No
[If Yes, specify the floor area of the working areas (for example, excluding shower areas)
in ranges [up to 30 sq.m. / 31-100 sq.m. / over 100 sq.m.].]
(b) Does the facility have rooms/other enclosures with a high level of biological
containment for human or animal pathogens, BL3 (as specified in the 1993 WHO
Laboratory Biosafety Manual) or equivalent?
Yes / No
[If Yes, specify the floor area of the working areas (for example, excluding shower areas)
in ranges [up to 30 sq.m. / 31-100 sq.m. / over 100 sq.m.].]
(c) Does the facility have rooms/other enclosures with a high level of biological
containment/quarantine for plants or plant pathogens?
Yes / No
[If Yes, specify the floor area in ranges [up to 30 sq.m. / 31-100 sq.m. / over 100 sq.m.].]
Equipment
OPTION A
Indicate any of the specified types of equipment that are present in the facility,
regardless of whether or not the equipment is operational.  For each item, indicate Yes or
No, or indicate the size range that applies, as appropriate.
OPTION B
Facility equipment information should be provided according to the trigger(s) that
applies:
13
When the trigger ... applies, answer equipment questions .......... only.
When the trigger ... applies, answer equipment questions .......... only.
When the trigger ... applies, answer equipment questions .......... only.  etc.
Scale of production
15. If the answer to questions 10 (l) or (m) was "Yes", provide the following information:
- Specify the type(s) of product: antibiotic/pesticide/insecticide/plant inoculant/human
or animal foodstuff/human or animal food additive/enzyme or enzyme source/fine chemical
or fine chemical source/proteins other than enzymes/other (specify).
- If more than one product applies, indicate which type constitutes the major activity.
- State, if any items were produced for general sale or use, either directly or after
further processing, formulation or packaging.
Information on aggregate capacity of fermenters has been provided above under
"Equipment".  Provide the following additional information:
16. Scale of use of tissue culture media used in the previous year.
Specifiy which range applies:  [up to a 1000 litres / 1000s of litres / 10,000s of litres].
17. Scale of use of inoculated eggs for growth of microorganisms used in the previous
year.
Specifiy which range applies:  [up to a 1000 eggs / 1000s of eggs / 10,000s of eggs].
18. Chemical reactors above 100 litres in capacity.
State aggregate reactor capacities, in ranges [101-1000 litres / over 1000 litres].
[Vaccination requirements
19. Are there any areas which can only be entered by personnel who have been
vaccinated?
Yes / No
If yes, are these areas in laboratories/production areas/downstream processing areas/other
(specify).  [List any vaccines that apply.]]
[International collaboration/cooperation
20. List any projects/activities funded or supported in any way by [international
organizations] [by other states and/or intergovernmental or non-governmental
organizations].]"
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Question 21 asks for general information on sites other than those declared above and Part B
requires limited information on activities which are projects supporting national biological
defence programmes.
Analysis
19.   It is thus evident that the numbers of facilities that will need to be declared will be of the
order of 10s per country, the information to be declared will not require any disclosure of
commercial proprietary information and the level of detail and amount of information
required in the envisaged declarations will be not be an undue burden on what is an already
highly regulated industry.
Visits
20.   The draft Protocol includes provision for a limited range of visits.   The current text
addresses visits in Article III F. Visits and Investigations with additional detail in Annex B.
Random and Clarification Visits.  Article III F considers four types of visits: random;
clarification; voluntary; and voluntary confidence-building.  As the last two would only occur
with the prior agreement of a facility, they are therefore not considered further here.
21. Consideration of the likely structure of the Protocol and size and operation of the likely
BTWC organisation makes it clear that there will never be large numbers of random visits.
It can justifiably be argued17 that
"...of the 100 visits and inspections each year, 20 would be to biological defence facilities
and 10 to past BW  facilities.  The remaining 70 would be for random visits, clarification
visits and voluntary visits..."
In the early years of implementation of the Protocol:
"...it is likely that there could be a number of Voluntary Visits to assist States Parties in
compiling their national and facility declarations and that there could also be a number of
Clarification Visits to resolve ambiguities, uncertainties, anomalies and omissions in
declarations.  It is suggested that there might be some 50 visits, both Voluntary and
Clarification, in the early years which could be expected to reduce in number in later
years as States Parties gained experience in compiling their declarations..."
Thus it follows that:
"...the number of Random Visits thus might be some 20 a year in the early years and
would increase as the numbers of Voluntary and Clarification Visits reduced but would
be unlikely to exceed 70 a year should the numbers of Voluntary and Clarification Visits
reach zero..."
Any one state is therefore unlikely to receive more than a very small number of visits in total
in any one year.  Moreover, it is clear from the Protocol that the nature of the visits will be
                                                
17University of Bradford, An Optimal Organisation.  Briefing Paper No. 5, January 1998.   Available on the
web at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
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carefully circumscribed to minimise the impact on legitimate operations.
22.   Although industry has voiced strong concerns18,19 about the idea of visits to its facilities,
it appears that these concerns predated the present development of the Protocol and the
appreciation of the probable numbers of declared facilities and of visits.    Certainly, the
current text makes it clear that visits will usually only be to a small number of declared sites.
A careful analysis of the requirements for an effective Protocol suggests that visits are a
necessary complement to declarations and challenge investigations20.  As MacEachin has
argued:21
"...Absent a regime for subjecting legitimate activities to a high degree of
transparency, the best way for a violator to carry out a covert programme would be
to bury it - piggy-back it - inside a legitimate programme..."
But if declared facilities are also subject, without the right of refusal, to non-challenge visits
then a violator is always at risk of discovery in using the declared site.  However, to move the
covert activity to an undeclared site means that all signs of the activity, not just its illegal
purpose, have to be kept secret as the undeclared site will be potentially subject to a challenge
investigation.  It seems most unlikely that the negotiators can afford to forego the powerful
combined regime - declarations, visits, and investigations.  Their task therefore has been to
craft visits in such a way as to protect legitimate industrial and national security concerns.  A
range of reasons have been put forward to justify the inclusion of Non-Challenge Visits in the
Protocol.
23.    It also seems that the negotiators are most unlikely to propose anything other than a
professional inspectorate with clear loyalty to the BTWC organisation -- and this is
something that the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry can be expected to welcome.
Only by utilizing a professional inspectorate can maximum protection of confidential
information be assured.  Consideration of the likely structure and finance of this organisation
again leads to the very important conclusion that its staffing and operations are going to be at
a much lower level than that of the OPCW, and thus that there are likely to be relatively small
numbers of visits to any one country and infrequent visits to any particular industrial site22,23.
                                                
18 Smithson, A. E., Man versus microbe: The negotiations to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention.  In
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Biotechnology Industry.  Paper presented to a meeting on 'A Strengthened Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention: Potential Implications for Biotechnology', organised by the Working Party on Safety in
Biotechnology of the European Federation of Biotechnology, Vienna, 28-9 May 1998.
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In short23:
"...if 100 visits and investigations were carried out annually and if visits to the
assumed 40 biological defence facilities were to occur more frequently, say once
every two years, then the number of visits to other declared facilities would be some
80 visits each year - or an average of one such visit to a State Party every two years."
[Emphasis added]
Another study of the future organization has shown that if an assumption is made of an
average of four people per inspection team and an average two days per visit, then the cost of
significantly increasing the numbers of visits and the consequential expansion of the
organisation would be large enough22 to suggest that it is unlikely to happen.
24.   In regard to the nature of Random Visits, the Protocol in Article III F. Visits and
Investigations makes clear in paragraph 2 that:
"[The BTWC Organization] shall conduct, in accordance with [this Article and] the
detailed provisions contained in the Annex [on Implementation of Random Visits] [...], a
limited number per year of Random Visits [which shall be non-confrontational [and
confidence-building] in nature] to declared facilities.  These visits shall be [designed to
confirm] [limited to confirming], in cooperation with the State Party to be visited that
the declarations are consistent with the obligations under this Protocol."   [Emphasis
added]
This strict limitation to cooperative confirmation of the declaration during the visit, for which
a standard mandate will be issued, is reinforced in the following paragraph:
"[3.  The visits shall be conducted in the least intrusive manner [and shall not affect or
interrupt [in any way] the activities taking place in the facility].]"
and, as reviewed24 previously, by strict conditions for the reasonable and fair distribution of
random visits between States Parties.
25. Clarification Visits necessarily have a more limited purpose than Random Visits.  The
current Protocol states that:
"8. [The BTWC Organization] [may] [shall] also conduct, [with the consent of the State
Party to be visited and] in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the detailed
provisions contained in [Annex B], Clarification Visits in order to resolve any
ambiguity, uncertainty, anomaly or omission in the declarations of a State Party and to
promote accuracy and comprehensiveness in future declarations."
[Emphasis added]
This strict limitation to matters related to resolving specific issues related to the declaration is
reinforced in paragraph 12 which states:
                                                                                                                                                      
24 University of Bradford, The Strengthened BTWC Protocol: An Integrated Regime.  Briefing Paper No. 10,
July 1998.    Available on the web at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
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"The Director General shall [, in cooperation with the State Party to be visited,] [in
accordance with [Annex B] [...]] [issue] [prepare] a mandate which shall be limited to
confirming that declarations are consistent with the obligations under this Protocol
and resolving the identified ambiguity, uncertainty, anomaly or omission..."
[Emphasis added]
Again there are, in regard to Clarification Visits, provisions for non-interruption of the work
of the facility and fair distribution of such visits between States.  Additionally, there is a
provision for prior consultation, clarification and cooperation under Article III. E (paragraphs
6 or 7).  Paragraph 11 of Article III. F also allows for the possibility of Clarification Visits to
undeclared facilities after such consultation processes.
26. The carefully circumscribed nature of both Random and Clarification Visits is further
reinforced by the Protocol in Annex B.  The Pre-Visit Procedures note, for example, that:
"...Members of the Visit Team shall be drawn from the permanent staff of the Technical
[Secretariat] [Body].  The size of the Visit Team shall be kept to the minimum necessary
for the proper fulfilment of the mandate, and shall not exceed [4] [6] persons..."
and:
"...The duration of a Random Visit [the visit] shall not exceed [48] hours, unless
extended by agreement of the Visit Team and the Visited [State Party] [facility]..."
On arrival the equipment of the Visit Team (listed in Appendix E) is subject to inspection
and approval by the visited State Party and during the visit representatives of the visited State
Party and the facility accompany the Visit Team "throughout the duration of the visit to the
facility".
27. The Visit Team is allowed to carry out interviewing, visual observation, identification of
key equipment and auditing.  Sampling and identification may only be conducted if offered
by the visited facility and then "mutually agreed sampling and analysis [shall] may be
performed by facility personnel", but in the presence of the Visit Team.  Most notably,
managed access procedures can be used:
"(E) MANAGED ACCESS
26. The visited State Party shall have the right, in accordance with the obligation to
demonstrate compliance and the right, if necessary, to protect sensitive information
as set out in ..., to take specific measures which may include but are not limited to
the following:
(a) Removal of sensitive papers from direct view;
(b) Shrouding of sensitive displays, stores, and equipment;
(c) Shrouding sensitive pieces of equipment, such as computer or 
electronic systems;
(d) Logging off of computer systems and turning off data indicating 
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devices;
(e) Using random selective access techniques whereby the team is 
requested to select a given percentage or number of buildings of their 
choice to investigate; the same principle can apply to the interior and 
content of sensitive buildings or documents;
(f) In exceptional cases, limiting the number of team members who have 
access to certain parts of a facility; and limiting the viewing angle; the 
reasons for such limitations shall be stated;
(g) Limiting the time team members may spend in any area or building, 
while allowing the team to fulfil its mandate; and limiting the viewing 
angle; the reasons for such limitations shall be stated;"
The Protocol adds that:
"(h)  The visited State Party may at any time during the visit identify products and
processes in which it has a proprietary interest in order to help the team respect the
visited State Party's right to safeguard proprietary information.  It may request that if a
specific piece of information is released to the team, it should be accorded the most
stringent protection measures by the Organization."
The draft report of the visit is to be submitted to the visited State Party which has the right to
comment and, if appropriate to impose confidentiality.
Analysis
28. The net impact of visits on the civil pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry would
therefore appear to be small.  In the first instance visits are directed, with very limited
exceptions in extreme circumstances, only at declared facilities, and, as we have seen, most
industry facilities will simply not be declared.  Then the size of the probable organisation is
such that only a very small number of visits by small teams of professional inspectors is
likely to take place in any one country.  Furthermore, any random or clarification visit will be
limited to checking the declaration of the visited facility and carried out under managed
access controlled by the facility.  Finally, it is clear from the text that sampling and analysis
are not under consideration unless offered by the visited facility.
Facility Investigations
29. There is little dissent over the need for an effective Protocol to include Challenge
Investigations25.  However, despite that fact, and the clear indications that very few such
investigations are likely to occur24, considerable concerns remain in the industrial world
about the potential loss of commercial proprietary information during intrusive facility
                                                
25 University of Bradford, The Importance of On-Site Investigations.  Briefing Paper No. 1, July 1997.
Available on the web at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
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investigations26.  This has led to attempts to argue that investigations should be first approved
under 'green light' procedures.   The reasons why there is a strong case for an Executive
Council to have the power to stop an investigation but not be required to approve its initiation
has been cogently argued27.
30. In considering the concerns expressed by industry, the question that has to be asked first,
however, is: How likely is it that an industrial facility in a country with a strong BTWC
and associated national legislation could ever be under any credible threat of receiving
a Challenge Investigation under any procedure?  Article III E. of the Protocol deals with
Consultation, Clarification and Cooperation in regard to Compliance Measures.  The text
indicates that if there is any question of concern preliminary efforts should be made to
resolve the matter between States Parties:
"3.  [Without prejudice to the right of any State Party to request an investigation] States
Parties [should] [shall] [,whenever possible,] [,as a rule,] first make every effort to
clarify and resolve, amongst themselves or with or through [the Organization], any
matter which may cause concern about possible non-compliance with the obligations of
this Protocol or the Convention, or which gives rise to concerns about [a matter which
may be considered ambiguous] [the implementation of the provisions of this Protocol]."
31.   Should such a consultation process in regard to an industrial facility not result in a
resolution of the concern, and should the BTWC Organization itself becomes involved, then
there is provision in the Protocol for the Executive Council to request the Director General to
consult appropriate experts and report to the Executive Council:
"10. For the purposes of obtaining further clarification requested...the [Executive]
[Consultative] [Council] may call on the Director-General to [consult the Scientific
Advisory Board and] establish [on the basis of equitable geographical distribution [if
possible]] a group of experts from the Technical [Secretariat] [Body] [, or if
appropriate staff are not available in the Technical [Secretariat] [Body], from the list of
[ad hoc] [part-time] experts nominated for designation by States Parties in accordance
with procedures as set out in Annex...and approved in advance], to examine all available
information and data relevant to the situation causing concern.  The group of experts
shall submit a factual report to the [Executive] [Consultative] [Council] on its findings."
32.   Against that background it needs to be recalled that, during the necessary consultation
and technical evaluation process, information should also become available from the national
framework of regulations and controls relating to industry28 as well as from the requirements
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of the national legislation under Article X of the  Protocol29.  Article X requires that each
State Party shall take necessary measures to:
"[(a)  Prohibit natural and legal persons anywhere on its territory or in any other place
under its jurisdiction as recognized by international law from undertaking any activity
prohibited [to a State Party] under the Convention [, including enacting penal legislation
with respect to such activity];]
[(b)  Prohibit natural and legal persons from undertaking any such activity anywhere
under its control; and]
[(c)  Prohibit, in conformity with international law, natural persons possessing its
nationality from undertaking such activity anywhere.]]"
33.  The kind of capabilities that recent developments in the US legal system have given to
the authorities attempting to control the misuse of pathogens and toxins in the United States30
illustrates the powers and requirements for information that States Parties should acquire.  In
such circumstances the mounting of a successful argument that a Challenge Investigation of
an industrial facility is necessary seems to lack any semblance of credibility.  In a State Party
with effective national monitoring of industry (such as, for example, the FDA in the United
States) linked to international agreements such as the Pharmaceutical Inspection Cooperation
Scheme and Mutual Recognition Agreements,28 backed up by national legislation to
implement the BTWC  Protocol, a mass of information to demonstrate compliance could be
provided by the particular State Party to convince other States of the reality of their
compliance.  Moreover, as the Protocol is implemented, such legislation is likely to grow
stronger and more integrated, thus decreasing the risk of abusive/frivolous challenge
investigations still further.
Analysis
34.    It is concluded that an industrial facility that is in fact in compliance with the BTWC in
a country with strong BTWC legislation and with a strong infrastructure of controls of health
and safety as well as of its pharmaceutical industry will not be the subject of a credible
investigation request.   Furthermore, it is considered that the provisions in the Protocol for the
prevention of frivolous or abusive investigation requests will be effective in preventing such
requests in regard to facilities in such a country being implemented.
Confidentiality
35. Article IV of the draft  Protocol sets out the Confidentiality Provisions.  This article, in its
first paragraph, states that the organisation shall:
"...take every precaution to protect the confidentiality of information on civil and military
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activities and facilities [including such information coming to its knowledge] in the
implemention of this Protocol and, in particular, shall abide by the confidentiality
provisions set forth in this Protocol."
The Director-General is required to establish and maintain a stringent regime for handling
confidential information.  This regime is to include provisions relating to:
"(i) The implementation of general principles for the handling of confidential
information, including the establishment of appropriate classification levels on the basis
of the sensitive nature of the information;
(ii) Conditions of staff employment relating to the protection of confidential information;
(iii) Measures to protect confidential information [obtained] in the course or as a result
of on-site activities;
(iv) Procedures in cases of breaches or alleged breaches of confidentiality;
(v) Procedures [including procedures for archiving] to protect confidential information;
(vi) Procedures for archiving of confidential information."
Whilst the confidentiality regime is still being developed the Protocol already contains
considerable detail.  Annex E on Confidentiality Provisions has sections with detailed text on
all but the last of this list.  This regime, incorporating rules to prevent the unauthorised
release of confidential information as well as rules that punish breaches, has many
similarities to that agreed for the Chemical Weapons Convention31.
36. Nevertheless, as Kellman has pointed out in regard to the Chemical Weapons
Convention, in the extreme case confidential proprietary information could still be lost32.
The biotechnology and pharmaceutical industry has argued that such a loss poses more of a
financial risk to them than it does to the chemical industry33.  However, in considering the
risk that a strengthened BTWC might pose to the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industry
it has to be asked whether this is of a different order from that posed by the possibility, for
example, of challenge inspections already accepted under the Chemical Weapons
Convention34.  Indeed last year I found35, as have other investigators36, that the position taken
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by the leadership of the industry in the United States was influenced strongly by factors other
than direct concern over loss of confidential proprietary information.  In my interviews,
scientists working in the US industry did not appear well informed about the Ad Hoc Group's
work but, given the threat of biological weapons and the amount of regulation they already
worked under, were supportive of the measures being developed to strengthen the
Convention especially if these were to be constructed so as to augment the controls that they
already had37.
Conclusion
37.  It is evident from the current draft Protocol that the Ad Hoc Group negotiators have done
an excellent job in meeting the requirements of their mandate to devise measures designed to
protect sensitive commercial proprietary information and to avoid any negative impact on
industrial development.  The declaration triggers will lead to declarations of tens rather than
hundreds (let alone thousands) of facilities in major industrial states.  The information
required for declarations will not require the provision of any confidential proprietary
information from the small number of sites declared.  Visits to this small number of declared
sites will be infrequent - of the order of one site visit per state every two years - and will be
carried out to confirm the accuracy of declarations with carefully designed provisions, such
as managed access, to ensure that confidential proprietary information is protected.  Whilst
challenge investigations would necessarily be more intrusive than such visits, it seems most
unlikely that a state with a strong BTWC regime in place alongside other national and
international regulatory frameworks could ever have a credible challenge request sustained
against a facility.  Finally, the arrangements in regard to confidentiality in the current draft
Protocol mirror closely those already accepted under the Chemical Weapons Convention
which already includes the possibility of a challenge inspection at any facility.
38.  It is concluded that the central elements of the Protocol of greatest concern to the
biotechnology and pharmaceutical industry - the requirements for declarations, the
procedures for visits to facilities, the facility investigations and the provisions for the
safeguarding of confidentiality - will not impose a significant additional burden upon
industry.  Moreover, in view of growing appreciation world-wide of the danger of misuse of
biological materials, it is probable that these extra regulations and controls will be quite
acceptable to those working in what is already a very highly regulated industry.
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